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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1106 (6) (a). This is an appeal from the decision of the
Sunset City Appeal Board entered on April 17, 2007.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. There was not sufficient substantial relevant evidence to establish that
Stewart Becker was under the influence of alcohol in violation of Sunset
Cities Rules and Regulations?
Standard of review: "When reviewing a formal adjudicative proceeding the
standard of review set out in Utah Code section 59-1-610 applies. The court
must review the Commission's finding

of fact under a "substantial

evidence" standard. See Utah Code Ann Section 59-1-610 (a) (1996). In
other words, the court of appeals must uphold those findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, or "that quantum and quality of relevant
evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion. The court of appeals must review the Commission's conclusion
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of law for correctness. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b).

Yeargin Inc. v.

Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 P 3 rd 287, 291 (UT 2001).
"Whether certain evidence is relevant is a question of law, reviewed under a
correction of error standard. " State v. Gonzalez 822 .2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
Ct.App.1991).
2. Whether the Sunset City appeals board relied solely upon hearsay evidence
in finding that Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol content of .04 in violation
of Sunset City policy. The standard of review for decisions of the Appeals
Board shall be on the record to determine "if the appeal board abused its
discretion or exceeded its authority. "UCA 10-3-110-6(5) (C), Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah Ct.
App.1995). Under this standard, reversal will not be granted unless the
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355,
1361 (Utah 1993) see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1993).
3. Whether the Sunset City Appeals Board abused its discretion by failing to
grant Mr. Becker's request for continuance and to obtain legal counsel? The
standard of review for decisions of the Appeals Board shall be on the record
to determine "if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its
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authority. "UCA 10-3-110-6(5) (C), Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civil
Serv. Commyn,908P.2d871,

874 (Utah Ct. App.1995). Under this standard,

reversal will not be granted unless the decision exceeds the limits of
reasonability." State v. Lars en, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) see also
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993).
4. Whether the Sunset City Appeals Board violated Officer

Becker's

Constitutional Right to a meaningful hearing including the right to confront
witnesses? The standard of review for constitutional questions is that no
deference should be given to the Appeals Board because constitutional
challenges constitute questions of general law. The Appeals Boards decision
regarding constitutional challenges is reviewed for correctness; Harmon v.
Ogden City 171 P.3rd 474, 477(UT. App .2007) citing Questar Pipeline Co.
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STAUTES, ORDINANCES AND
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Constitution of State of Utah Article 1, Section 7 Declaration of Rights.
Constitution of United States-Bill of Rights Amendment V. (Rights of Persons)
Section 10-3-1106 UCA
Sunset City Policy Personnel Policies and Procedures 14.2.1
Sunset City Policy Personnel Policies and Procedures 14.7.1 (c)

R714-500-4 through 7 (Rules and Regulations of State of Utah)
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
The challenged findings on this appeal are whether there was competent
evidenced to establish that Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol level equal to or
greater than .040 in violation of Sunset City policy and whether Stewart Becker
was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses and to a fair hearing and
to be represented by counsel as a result of the Sunset City Appeals Boards refusal
to grant a continuance based on good cause shown.
MARSHALED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDING OF THE
SUNSET CITY APPEALS BOARD
1. On April 1, 2007 Officer Becker arrived on shift and met with Sgt. Arbogast
Sgt. Arbogast smelled a 'strong odor of alcohol' on Officer Becker. Sgt
Arbogast request Officer Becker to blow into a PBT (Portable Breath Test)
which registered .045 (R. p. 122).
2. On April 1, 2007 Utah State Troopers Michelle McLaughlin and Arlow
Hancock were at the Sunset City Policy Department to reset the clock on the
breathalyzer machine and came in contact with Officer Becker. Both troopers
could smell an "odor of alcohol" coming from Officer Becker and his patrol car
(R. pp. 136-141).
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3. Officer Becker acknowledged taking two stiff drinks with about two and one
half shots of liquor in each before going to bed at approximately 8-9 a.m, on the
morning of April 1, 2007(R. pp.122, 124-125, ).
4. Officer Becker acknowledged speaking with the two Highway patrol troopers
on April 1, 2007 and that he used some hand sanitizer and breath mints in an
attempt to help mask the odor of alcohol. He admitted that he felt somewhat
uncomfortable and knew they would have noticed the odor (R. p. 122).
5. Both Highway Patrol officers noticed the odor of alcohol on Officer Becker,
and reported it to Sgt. Arbogast who indicated that "he was aware of the
problem." (R. p. no numbering on page. Page following 136-141).
6. Officer Becker acknowledges that when he took a portable breath test (PBT) the
result was .045 (R. p. 172).
7. Officer Becker was aware of Sunset City personnel policies 14.7.1 (h) defining
being under the influence with a blood alcohol content of 0.04 (R. p. 172).
8. Officer Becker previously acknowledged to Chief Ebom that in his usage of the
portable breath test it has proven to be accurate (R. p. 126,173).
9. Officer Becker acknowledged a blood alcohol level of .12 before going to bed
and going to work five hours later (R. p. 173).
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lO.On April 10, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board, by Registered Mail, sent
Notice to Stewart Becker, informing him that the hearing on his appeal was
scheduled on May 16, 2007 (R pp.48, 157)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the May 17,2007 decision of the Sunset City Appeals
Board, upholding the termination of Stewart Becker, a Sunset City police officer.
On April 3, 2007 Stewart Becker, a Sunset City police officer, appellant
herein was terminated by the Sunset City Chief of Police for being intoxicated,
within the definition of the Sunset City policy definition, when reporting to duty.
Mr. Becker's blood alcohol content was .045. The blood alcohol content was
determined by the use of a portable breathalyzer test (PBT) (R. p. 122). It is
appellant's position that a PBT is not competent evidence to support termination.
On April 5, 2007 Mr. Becker filed an Appeal with the Sunset City Appeals
Board (R 244).
On April 16, 2007 a hearing was held before the Appeals Board. Officer
Becker requested a continuance based on inadequate notice and the fact that he was
not represented by counsel. The hearing proceeded with only Stewart Becker and
the Sunset City Chief of Police offering testimony. (R. pp. 157-186)
On April 17, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board issued its decision
affirming Officer Becker's termination. (R. p. 244)
8

On May 11, 2007 Officer Becker filed an Appeal of the Sunset Appeals
Board with this court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Stewart Becker, appellant, has been employed as police officer by the Sunset
City Police Department for two years. During the one year period prior to April 1,
2007 Officer Becker had been assigned to the grave yard shift working from
midnight until 6 a.m. On the morning of April 1, 2007 Stewart Becker worked his
final 'grave yard shift" getting off work at 6 a.m. This was Officer Becker's first
"short shift" being required to report back to work at 2 p.m. (R. p. 160). As was
his practice, and as a sleep aid before going to bed, Officer Becker consumed two
drinks and went to sleep at approximately 9 a.m. (R. pp. 122,124-125. 160).
Officer

Becker arrived at the Sunset City Police Department at

approximately 2 p.m. on April 1, 2007. During a conversation with Sgt. Arbogast
the Sgt. could smell an odor of alcohol on Officer Becker. Sergeant Arbogast asked
Officer Becker to take a portable breath test, hereinafter referred to as "PBT" in
spite of the fact that they were standing near the department's certified breath
intoxilyzer (R. p. 122). At the time Officer Becker was requested to take the
"PBT" two Highway Patrol Officer were present to reset the clock on the
intoxilyzer (R. p. 122). Both officers indicated that they could smell the odor of
alcohol on Officer Becker (R. pp. 136-141). Officer Becker was "absolutely
9

shocked" that the "PBT" registered .045 (R. p. 160). When he arrived at work
Officer Becker had no idea that he had any detectible amount of alcohol in his
system (R. p. 175).When he took a second "PBT" at his residence less than one
hour later the "PBT" registered .012 (R. p. 160)
On April 2, 2007 an apparent "pre-termination hearing" was conducted at
the Sunset Police Department (Record p. 124).
On April 4, 2008, at 1:15 P.M., Officer Becker was notified of a meeting to
be held in Chief Eborns' office at 1:30 p.m. At this meeting Officer Becker was
advised of his termination (Record p. 128). A termination letter dated April 3, 2007
was given to Officer Becker (Record 132).
On April 5, 2007 Officer Becker filed an appeal with the Sunset City
regarding his termination (R. p. 7).
On April 10, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board, by Registered Mail, sent
Notice to Stewart Becker, informing him that the hearing on his appeal was
scheduled on May 16, 2007 (R pp.46, 157). Mr. Becker never received notice of
hearing but learned of the scheduled hearing on the morning of May 16, 2007, the
day of the hearing (R 158). On May 16, 2007 Officer Becker attended the hearing,
without counsel. Officer Becker advised the Appeals Board that he had just learned
of the hearing and it was his intention to "cover every base possible" (R. p. 157).
One of the bases that Officer Becker intended to "cover" was the fact that his
10

termination was based on the bias of the Chief of Police and Sgt. Arbogast. Officer
Becker did not know how to subpoena witnesses or how to present his defense
without the assistance of an attorney. He requested a continuance to allow him
sufficient time to prepare and to be represented by counsel. He represented that he
had a scheduled appointment with his attorney on Wednesday (R pp. 157-158).
Officer Becker's request for continuance was denied (R157-158). The only
testimony at the hearing was from Officer Becker and the Sunset City Chief of
Police.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
The Sunset City Appeal Board rendered a decision that was not based on
competent evidence to support the department's contention that appellant was
intoxicated while on duty.
POINT n
The Sunset City Appeal Board impermissibly relied solely upon hearsay
evidence to support its finding that Officer Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol
content in his blood system of .04 or greater.
POINT III
The Sunset City Appeal Board abused its discretion and authority by failing
to grant appellants request for continuance upon a showing of good cause.
11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD WAS NOT BASED UPON
COMPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT
APPELLANT WAS INTOXICATED WHEN HE REPORTED TO DUTY
Officer Stewart Becker was terminated because it was determined by the use
of a portable breathalyzer (PBT) that he was intoxicated at work. The (PBT)
indicated that Officer Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol content of .045. The
intoxication level established by city policy is 0.04. See Sunset City Corporation
Personnel, Policies and Procedures-Section 14.7.1 (h) which provides:
h. Under the Influence means when an employee is affected by
a drug or alcohol or the combination of drugs and alcohol to the extent
that it affect his or her ability to perform their job in a safe manner.
An employee testing positive for any of the above mentioned illegal
drugs, or whose test detects a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of 0.04
or greater, shall be deemed under the influence.
The literal lynch pin and only evidence that could establish a blood alcohol
level in Officer Becker's blood stream, above the .04 level set by the City to
establish intoxication, was the results of an inadmissible, unreliable and
unverifiable PBT test result that is not authorized or approved by Sunset Cities
drug testing procedure which requires that "All drug testing and results obtained
under the requirements of this policy will be coordinated with and authorized by
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the City Administrative Assistant or his/her designee, Sunset City Policy Personnel
Policies and Procedures 14.2.1 and 14.7.1 (c) authorizing a urine test.
14.2.1 Sunset City prohibits the use, possession and/or
distribution on its premises, facilities and/or work places of any of the
following: alcoholic beverages, intoxicants and narcotics, illegal or
unauthorized drugs (including marijuana), and related drug
paraphernalia. In addition, a city employee will not be allowed to
report for work under the influence of any drug, alcoholic beverage,
intoxicant or narcotic or other substance (including legally prescribed
drugs and medicines) which will in any way adversely affect his or
her working ability alertness, coordination, response, or adversely
affect the safety of other on the job.
Such use, possession, distribution, or impairment during
working hours (breaks and lunches included) and/or on City premises
will be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including
termination. All drug testing and results obtained under the
requirements of this policy will be coordinated with and authorized by
the City Administrate
Assistant or his/her designee. All such
activities will be kept confidential. (See also R. p. 211)
14.7.1 (c) Drug/Alcohol Testing is an analysis of a urine
specimen provided by the employee. (See also R. p. 213)
In this case a urine specimen was not obtained from Officer Becker pursuant
to the Sunset City drug and alcohol policy under the direction of the Assistant City
Administrator as required by the policy. Sunset City Policy does not authorize a
breath "PBT" test but specifically provides for a urine test. Counsel cannot identify
any cases where a court has accepted the use of a "PBT" as substantial competent
evidence to support a finding of intoxication. Further counsel cannot identify any
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cases where a court has authorized the "substitution" of a testing method
specifically required by a City policy.
Assuming Sunset City policy somehow allowed "PBT" analysis of a breath
alcohol test rather than a urinalysis, evidence was not introduced to establish that
the "PBT" was approved as a certified breath alcohol testing instrument within the
requirements of R714-500-4 Regulation of the State of Utah1 which requires that
all breath alcohol testing instruments employed by Utah law enforcement officers,
to be used for evidentiary purposes, shall be approved by the department. No
evidence was introduced to establish that the department has approved the use of
"PBT's" for evidentiary purposes. The administrative law judge, who ruled on the
use of the "PBT" during the unemployment compensation correctly, determined
that a "PBT" was not admissible as evidence to establish intoxication (R. pp. 7481). See also Appendix setting forth R714-500-4, R714-500-5, R714-500-6, and
R714-500-7).
Further, while there is "universal acceptance of the reliability of
[breathalyzer] evidence, Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2nd 499,500 (Utah 1987)
(quoting, Murray City v. Hall 663 P. 2nd 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983), such reliance is
premised upon the operation of the testing device Layton City v. Peronek 808 P.

1

This is an example that had Officer Becker been represented by counsel at the hearing, counsel would have
objected to the introduction of the "PBT" and additionally would have preserved a hearsay objection to the test
being offered through a witness that did not administer the test and was not present when the test was conducted.

14

2nd 1294, 1299-1300 (UT. App. 1990).

Even if this particular "PBT" was

approved by the Department of Public Safety, which it was not, there was no
evidence that the PBT was operating properly, had been maintained and was
operated on this occasion by a qualified operator as required by R. 714-500-6 &7.
(See Appendix)

In fact, the Sunset City Chief of Police testified at another

hearing that "he did not know how long it had been since the PBT used here was
tested prior to the test given to the claimant" (R. p. 81). The fact that the
department had no record of testing additionally precludes the admissibility of the
test results pursuant to R. 714-500-5 D. (2) which requires the department to,
among other things; maintain test records (R. p. 78). Officer Becker testified that
"PBT's" are not admissible in court and that when they have errors they are on the
high side (R. p. 161).
Even if one were to assume that "PBT" test results were admissible as
competent evidence the fact that the test results were introduced through the
hearsay statements of the Sunset City Chief of Police, who was not present when
the test was administered, denied defendant's constitutional due process right of
meaningful confrontation without any showing of good cause when Sunset City
chose to make its case through the Chief of Police, who had only limited
knowledge, rather than the person who was actually involved. See. Layton City v.
2

This is another illustration where, had appellant been represented, counsel would have objected and attempted to
education the Appeal Board regarding competent evidence and the city policy to rely on urine testing
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Peronek 808 P. 2nd 1294, 1299 (UT. App. 1990).3 Additionally Section 10-3-1106
UCA (4) (c) provides:
(4) an employee who is the subject of the discharge,
suspension, or transfer may: (a) appear in person and be represented
by counsel^ (b) have a public hearing; (c) confront the witness whose
testimony is to be considered ; and 9d) examine the evidence to be
considered by the appeal board.

At a minimum, due process requires the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation Id, 1299 citing U.S. v. Holland 850 F.2d 561, 564 (5th
Circuit 1988) citing with approval Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
The decision of the Appeal Board was arbitrary and capricious.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD WAS BASED SOELEY
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
The PE&T test result relied upon by the Appeals Board to uphold the
termination of Officer Becker is a written hearsay statement within the meaning of
Section 801 Utah Rules of Evidence which defines hearsays statements as:
(a)

Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion.

3

This is another illustration where, had appellant been represented, counsel would have objected to the hearsay
testimony and statement and attempted to education the Appeal Board regarding competent evidence and appellants
right to confront witnesses.
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(b)
(c)

Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a
statement.
Hearsay. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.

Although hearsay evidence, even if objected to, is admissible in an
administrative hearing an administrative decision "cannot be based exclusively on
hearsay evidence," Hoskings v. Industrial Commission of Utah 918 P. 2d 150, 155
(UT. App 1996) citing Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n 681 P. 2d
1224, 1226 (Utah 1984).
To support the findings of an administrative tribunal "there must be a
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a court of law." Hackford v.
Industrial Comm'n, 358 P. 2d 899, 901 (UT. 1961), Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor
Control Commission 619 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984).
In this case there is no residuum of legal evidence that could possibly
establish a blood alcohol content equal to or exceeding 0.04.
A decision of an administrative tribunal is deemed arbitrary and capricious
"if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record" Save our Canyons v.
Board of Adjustment 116 P.3d 978, 983(Utah App.2005).
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POINT m
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANTS REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE WAS
AN ABUSE OF DESCRETION DENYING APPELLANT'S
CONSTITUTION RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING AND ADDITIONALLY
BY RELYING ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE DENIED APPELLANTS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES
Post-depravation of employment procedures must comport with due process
requirements providing for a fair hearing Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 949 P. 2d 746, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The bare essentials of due
process mandate adequate notice to those with an interest in the matter and an
opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner, Chen v. Stewart, 100
P.3d 1177 (2004 UT).
Officer Becker did not receive adequate notice of the hearing. There is no
dispute that the Appeals Board attempted to provide notice of the hearing to
Officer Becker by registered mail that he did not receive. Likewise, there is no
dispute that Officer Becker did not receive actual notice of the hearing until the
morning of the hearing (R. 158). When the Appeals Board became aware that
Office Becker had not received notice of the hearing until the morning of the
hearing and had not had an opportunity to subpoena witnesses or retain counsel it
was an abuse of the Board's discretion to proceed.
The means a State employs to provide notice "must be such as one desirous
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it" Jones
18

v. Flowers 547 U.S 220, (2006) citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co 339 U.S. 306, 315. The adequacy of a particular form of notice is assessed by
balancing the State's interest against "the individual interest sought to be protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 314.
In this case an evaluation of the adequacy of notice provided Officer Becker
prior to the City's decision to conduct a hearing to extinguish his protected right of
employment is necessary. In Jones, supra, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether notice to a property owner whose property was about to be
taken was sufficient when the taking authority became aware that mailed notice
had failed. Although the taking in Jones, was real property the issue is the same;
whether due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment was satisfied when
notice although given as required by statue was known to have failed. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not distinguish a property interest in employment
versus a property interest in real property. In its analysis the Jones court indicated
that "It is unlikely that a person who actually desired to inform an owner about and
impending tax sale of a house would do nothing when a certified letter addressed
to the owner is returned unclaimed. The sender would ordinarily attempt to resend
the letter, if that is practical especially given that it concerns the import and
irreversible prospecting of losing a house," Jones Id.
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Like the State in Jones, the City may have made a reasonable calculation of
how to reach Officer Becker but in this case it knew that Officer Becker did not
receive adequaite notice of the hearing when it became aware that Officer Becker
had not received notice until the morning of the hearing (R. p. 157, 158). When
balancing the city's interest to proceed with an immediate hearing when it knew
that notice was inadequate to allow Officer Becker to prepare for a meaningful
hearing the scales must tip in favor of Officer Becker. Officer Becker's Fourteenth
Amendment right to a meaningful hearing, where he had a statutory right to be
represented by counsel, subpoena witness, and adequately challenge evidence,
must outweigh the cities interest to proceed. Under the circumstances of this case,
it was an abuse of the Appeal Boards discretion not to grant Officer Becker a
continuance especially since Utah law provided authority for the board to extend
the hearing period. Section 10-3-1106 (5) (a) (ii) UCA 1953 provides:
For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under
Subsection (5) (a) (i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and
municipality both consent.
Based on the clearly demonstrated lack of adequate notice and knowing
Officer Becker's intention at the hearing was to "cover every base possible" and to
be represented by an attorney (R. p. 157). Chairman Isom did not consider or
discuss whether Officer Becker had demonstrated good cause for his requested
continuance.

Chairman Isom did not ask the city if it would consent to a
20

continuance based on good cause shown. The record is absent of any objection by
the city to the request for continuance. The record clearly demonstrates that
Chairman Isom intended to proceed with the hearing with full knowledge that
Officer Becker was not prepared to proceed (R. p. 158). After receiving Officer
Becker's request for a continuance, Chairman Isom only requested confirmation
that the "letter" had been sent, informing Officer Becker of the hearing. His only
question to Officer Becker regarding his request for continuance was; "And you
are not going to meet with your attorney until Wednesday?" (R. p. 158).
Chairman Isom's statement regarding his decision to proceed with the
hearing should be interpreted as the ruling on the request for continuance was;
"You made your appeal immediately. We have 15 days total to
make our decision. So, regardless, once it's, once it's here we have a
total 15 days and that ends on the 20th of April." (R. p. 158).
Chairman Isom was either not aware of or totally disregarded the Appeal
Boards discretionary authority to extend the 15 day time period up to a maximum
of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
Had Officer Becker been represented by an attorney there can be little doubt
that the attorney would have identified Section 10-3-1106 (5) (a) (ii) and
vigorously argued that "good cause" for the continuance had been established. In
light of the fact that counsel, had they been present, would not have had
insufficient time to prepare for the hearing competent counsel would no doubt have
21

requested a stipulation from the City to extend the hearing. Counsel could have
educated the Appeal Board regarding the legal standard followed by Utah courts
regarding "good cause." Good cause has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court
as "to be a "special circumstance" that was beyond the party's control." In the
Matter of General Determination of Right to the Use of Water v. Olds No.
20060234 March 21, 2008 (UT. 2008) citing with approval Green River Canal Co.
v. Olds 110 P. 2d. 666 (UT. 2004).
Although, appellate counsel realizes that speculation and argument not
supported by the record is not appropriate, counsel recognizes his obligation to
establish how the denial of Officer Becker's request for a continuance or right to
be represented by counsel were harmful and how they would have resulted in a
different outcome, Lucas v. Murray Civil Service Commission 949 P.2d 746, (UT.
App. 1997).
The Appeals Board abused its discretion by failing to grant Officer Becker a
continuance based on inadequate notice resulting in the denial of Officer Becker's
constitutional right to a meaningful hearing, including the right to confront
witnesses against him. Had Officer Becker's motion for continuance been granted
and Officer Becker had been represented by counsel the arguments set forth in
Point I further demonstrate how the outcome of the case would have likely been
different and the necessity for reversal of the decision of the Appeals Board.
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CONCLUSION
Whether Officer Becker had alcohol on his breath when he reported for
work, used alcohol in the past, drank alcohol before going to bed, smelled like
alcohol when he got to work, or whether he attempted to conceal the odor of
alcohol from his Sergeant or Highway Patrol troopers does not establish a
residuum of evidence than can be relied upon to prove that Officer Becker reported
to work with a blood alcohol content greater than .04. The only issue before the
Sunset City Appeal Board was whether Officer Becker had a blood alcohol content
of .04 or greater when he reported for duty. The only permissible evidence that
should have been utilized by Sunset City pursuant to their policy would have been
a urine test. Instead the only evidence offered and relied upon to establish a blood
alcohol level was hearsay testimony of the Sunset City Chief of Police regarding
"PBT" test results. Because a "PBT" test result is not competent evidence to
establish blood alcohol content the decision of the Appeals Board should be
reversed, for this reason alone, as arbitrary and capricious.
Additionally, and perhaps equally egregious, in light of the fact that it was
established that Officer Becker did not receive adequate notice of the hearing, is
the denial by the Appeal Board of Officer Becker's requested continuance for the
purpose of being represented by counsel so that he could adequately defend
himself. The Appeal Board proceeded knowing that Officer Becker was not
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prepared. The Board new that Officer Becker did not receive notice of the hearing
until the morning of the hearing and that he was not represented by counsel.
Instead of accommodating Officer Becker the Appeal Board proceeded with the
hearing effectively denying Officer Becker's constitutional right to a fair hearing.
To make matters worse the Appeal Board relied solely on the hearsay
testimony of the Sunset City Chief of Police to establish the blood alcohol content,
again denying Officer Becker's constitutional right to confront witnesses, and
affirmed the Chief of Police's decision to terminate by relying on inadmissible
"PBT" evidence that clearly would have been objected to had Officer Becker been
represented by counsel.
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Sunset City Appeal Board
should be reversed. Officer Becker should be ordered reinstated, with back pay
from the date of his termination. The reversal should not contain a remand for
rehearing because there is now no way to determine Officer Becker's blood
alcohol content at the time he was originally accused.
DATED this

$1

day of October, 2008.

Jerrald D. Conder
Attorney for Appellant
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Amendments

Section (1) All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.
Section (2) Representatives shall be appropriate among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for the President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State or the
members of the Legislatures thereof is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridge, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime the basis
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State .
Section (3) No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may
be vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section (4) The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
illegal and void.

Section (5) The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
Article (1) Declaration of Rights

Section (7) Due Process of Law
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
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R714-500-4 through 7
R714-500-4 Instrument Certification
A. Acceptance: All breath alcohol testing instruments employed by Utah
law enforcement officers, to be used for evidentiary purposes, shall be
approved by the department.
(1) The department shall maintain an approved list of accepted instruments
for use in the state. Law enforcement entities shall select breath alcohol
instruments from this accepted list, which list shall be available for public
inspection at the department during normal working hours.
(2) A manufacturer may make application for approval of an instrument by
brand and/or model not on the list. The department shall subsequently examine
and evaluate each instrument to determine if it meets criteria specified by this
rule and applicable purchase requisitions.
B. Criteria: In order to be approved, each manufacturer's brand and/or model
of breath testing instrument shall meet the following criteria.
(1) Breath alcohol analysis of an instrument shall be based on the principle
of infra-red energy absorption, or any other similarly effective procedure
specified by the department.
(2) Breath specimen collected for analysis shall be essentially alveolar
and/or end expiratory in composition according to the analysis method utilized.
(3) The instrument shall analyze a reference sample, such as headspace gas
from a mixture of water and a known weight or volume of ethanol, held at a
constant temperature, or a compressed inert gas and alcohol mixture in a
pressurized cylinder. The result of the analysis must agree with the reference
sampled predicted value, within plus or minus 5%, or .005, whichever is
greater, or such limits as set by the department. For example, if a known
reference sample is .10, a plus or minus range of 5%=.005 (.10x5 %= .005).
The test result, using a known .10 solution or compressed inert gas and alcohol
solution, could range from .095-. 105.
(4) The instrument shall provide an accurate and consistent analysis of
breath specimen for the determination of alcohol concentration for law
enforcement purposes. The instrument shall function within the manufacturers
specifications of:
(a) electrical power,
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(b) operating temperature,
(c) internal purge,
(d) internal calibration,
(e) diagnostic measurements,
(f) invalid test procedures,
(g) known reference sample testing,
(h) measurements of breath alcohol, as displayed in grams of alcohol per
210 liters of breath.
(5) Any other tests, deemed necessary by the department, may be required in
order to correctly and adequately evaluate the instrument, to give the most
accurate and correct results in routine breath alcohol testing and be practical
and reliable for law enforcement purposes.
C. List: Upon proof of compliance with this rule, an instrument may be
approved by brand and/or model and placed on the list of accepted
instruments. By inclusion on the department's list of accepted instruments, it
will be deemed to have met the criteria listed above.
D. Certification: All breath alcohol instruments purchased for law
enforcement evidentiary purposes, shall be certified before being placed into
service.
(1) The breath alcohol testing program supervisor, hereinafter, "program
supervisor", shall determine if each individual instrument, by serial number,
conforms to the brand and/or model that appears on the commissioner's
accepted list.
(2) Once an individual instrument has been purchased, found to be operating
correctly and placed into service, the Certificate of Calibration with the serial
number of that instrument, shall be placed in a file for certified instruments.
Certificates of Calibration verifying the certification of any breath testing
instrument shall be available during normal business hours through the
Department of Public Safety, more specifically the Utah Highway Patrol
Training Section, 5681 S. 320 West, Murray, UT 84107.
(3) The department may, at any time, determine if a specific instrument is
unreliable and/or unserviceable. Pending such a finding, an instrument may be
removed from service and certification may be withdrawn.
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(4) Only certified breath alcohol testing technicians, hereinafter
"technicians", as defined by Section 7 of this rule when required, shall be
authorized to provide expert testimony concerning the certification and all
other aspects of the breath testing instrument under his/her supervision.
R714-500-5. Program Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, methods, and programs, hereinafter
"program", must be certified by the department.
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or laboratory shall submit an
application to the department for certification. The application shall show the
brand and/or model of the instrument to be used and contain a resume of the
program to be followed. An on-site inspection shall be made by the department
to determine compliance with all applicable provisions in this rule.
C. Certification of a program may be denied, suspended, or revoked by the
department if, based on information obtained by the department, program
supervisor, or technician, the agency or laboratory fails to meet the criteria as
outlined by the department.
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall meet the following criteria:
(1) The results of tests to determine the concentration of alcohol on a
personfs breath shall be expressed as equivalent grams of alcohol per 210 liters
of breath. The results of such tests shall be entered in a permanent record book
for department use.
(2) Printed checklists, outlining the method of properly performing breath
tests shall be available at each location where tests are given. Test record cards
used in conjunction with breath testing shall be available at each location
where tests are given. Both the checklist and test record card, after completion
of a test should be retained by the operator.
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a routine basis, not to exceed 40
days between calibration tests, by a technician, depending on location of
instruments and area of responsibility.
(4) Certification procedures to certify the breath testing instrument shall be
performed by a technician as required in this rule, or by using such procedures
as recommended by the manufacturer of the instrument to meet its
performance specifications, as derived from:
(a) electrical power tests,
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(b) operating temperature tests,
(c) internal purge tests,
(d) internal calibration tests,
(e) diagnostic tests,
(f) invalid function tests,
(g) known reference samples testing, and
(h) measurements displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(5) Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book
retained by the technician. A report of the certification procedure shall be
recorded on the approved form Certificate of Calibration and sent to the
program supervisor.
(6) Except as set forth in paragraph 7 in this section, all analytical results on
a subject test shall be recorded, using terminology established by state statute
and reported to three decimal places. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L
shall be reported as 0.237.
(7) Internal standards on a subject test do not have to be recorded
numerically.
(8) The instrument must be operated by either a certified operator or
technician.
R714-500-6. Operator Certification.
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators", must be
certified by the department.
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a
program supervisor and/or technician.
C. Initial Certification
(1) In order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing
instrument, an applicant must successfully complete a course of instruction
approved by the department, which must include as a minimum the following:
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing.
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c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.L Summons and Citation/D.U.L
Report Form.
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical
testing, driving under the influence, case law and other alcohol related laws.
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated
tests on the instruments, including demonstrations under the supervision of a
class instructor.
f. One hour for examination and critique of course.
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a certificate
will be issued that will be valid for two years.
D. Renewal Certification
(1) The operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration
date. The minimum requirement for renewal of operator certification will be:
a. Two hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body.
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing.
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I.
Report Form and testimony of arresting officer.
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and
detecting the drinking driver.
e. One hour for examination and critique of course.
f Or the operator must successfully complete the Compact Disc Computer
program including successful completion of exam. Results of exams must be
forwarded to program supervisor and a certification certificate will be issued.
(2) Any operator who allows his/her certification to expire one year or
longer must retake and successfixlly complete the initial certification course as
outlined in paragraph C of this section.
R714-500-7. Technician Certification.
A. All technicians, must be certified by the department.
B. The minimum qualifications for certification as a technician are:

(1) Satisfactory completion of the operator's initial certification course
and/or renewal certification course.
(2) Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's
course offered by Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as
approved by the program supervisor.
(3) Satisfactory completion of the manufacturer's maintenance/repair
technician course.
(4) Maintain technician's status through a minimum of eight hours training
each calendar year. This training must be directly related to the breath alcohol
testing program, and must be approved by the program supervisor.
C. Any technician who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph B, subparagraph (4) of this section and allows his/her certification to expire for more
than one year, must renew his/her certification by meeting the minimum
requirements as outlined in paragraph B, sub-paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of
this section.
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10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer -Appeals — Board — Procedure.
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged,
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less
remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing
body, or heads of departments.
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without
pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less
remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b),
appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to
be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee
shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before
appealing to the board.
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice
of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance
procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal
recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and frilly
hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge,
suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer
may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall
be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it,
except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
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(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection
(5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent.
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the
employee shall receive:
(i) the employees salary for the period of time during which the employee is
discharged or suspended without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was
transferred to a position of less remuneration.
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court
of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals1 review shall be on the record of the appeal board and
for the
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its
authority.
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board,
the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure
for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the
governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a
council-mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board.
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session
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